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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Citizenship-Expatriation by voting in a
foreign political election
.By

WILBUR SATO

Wilbur Sato received his A. B. degree from the University of California. He
is a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Petitioner, a national of the United States by birth, admitted voting
voluntarily in a 1946 Mexican political election. He was declared to have
lost his citizenship' by operation of § 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of
1940 - which provides that a citizen shall lose his citizenship by voting in a
foreign political election. Petitioner sought to have the judgment against
him reversed on the ground that the enactment of this provision was beyond the power of Congress. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed the judgment of the lower court in a five to four
decision. The Court found an implied power in Congress to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs and held that § 401 (e)
was an appropriate means of exercising this power. The doctrine of
Voltntary expatriation as recognized by statute' was not considered
relevant. Mr. Justice Whittaker conceded that Congress had acted
within the scope of its powers, but dissented on other grounds. Perez v.
Brownell, 78 Sup. Ct. 568 (1958).
The principle adopted in the Perez case was first announced in a
1915 denationalization case in MacKenzie v. Hare.' In that case a native
born citizen was held to have lost her citizenship under a 1907 act 5 which
provided that any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take
the nationality of her husband. Mrs. MacKenzie, who was continuously
domiciled in the United States, contended that Congress could not
impose loss of citizenship for marriage to a foreigner. The Supreme Court
held that Mrs. MacKenzie had lost her citizenship through voluntary
expatriation, and announced by way of preliminary explanation that
the United States had the powers of a sovereign nation, including those
which concern its relations with other sovereigns.'
The only other nationalism case in which the doctrine of sovereign
powers has been invoked is Ex parte Griffin, which arose under a different provision of the 1907 act. This section imposed loss of citizenship
for taking an oath of allegiance to another nation. The petitioner took
an oath of allegiance to the King in joining the Canadian army. In upholding denial of re-entry on grounds that petitioner was an alien, the
court declared that though there is no express grant of power to Congress in the Constitution to declare what acts on the part of citizens
235 F.2d 364 (1956).
"54 Stat. 1137 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801(e) (1940).
3 Act of July 27, 1868, c. 249, § 1. 15 Stat. 223.
4 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
Act of March 7, 1907, c. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228.
0239 U.S. at 311.
1 237 Fed. 445 (N.D. N.Y. 1916).
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Constitute abandonment and renunciation of citizenship, there is an
implied power arising as a necessary conconitant of sovereignty.' The
Court cited MacKenzie as authority for its declaration. The case of Ex
parte (Ng) Fung Sing' should be mentioned here because in that case
the court asserted that citizenship is a political status and privilege which
Congress may define and limit. Other cases in which this constitutional
issue has been touched upon are not persuasive. "
Prior to Perez, the doctrine of sovereign powers seems to have had
its greatest vitality in other fields. In the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, " where the issue was whether a joint resolution
of Congress met the standard for valid delegation of legislative authority to the executive, Mr. Justice Sutherland declared that the power of
government in respect to foreign affairs is not limited by the Constitution.
He reasoned that this power is vested in the government as a necessary
concomitant of sovereignty."
In only two pre-Perez cases involving loss of citizenship for voting
in a foreign political election has the constitutional issue been seriously
considered. Both cases arose in the federal district court for Hawaii. In
Okiniura v. Acheson,'" the court declared § 401 (e) of the Nationality
Act of 19,10 to be unconstitutional on the ground that Congress (lid not
have the power to take away citizenship. " Secretary of State Acheson appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court. That court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case with directions to make findings
as to whether the petitioner's conduct was voluntary." On rehearing, the
district court found the acts to be involuntary, and the petitioner was
declared to be a citizen of the United States.'
In the later case of
Terada v. Dulles, " involving the same section of the act, the same district court held that Congress was without power to provide for autonatic divestiture of citizenship. This ruling was not appealed.
In the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark" the power of Congress to alter the status of citizenship was in question. The Court held
that the Constitution has conferred on Congress no right to alter or restrict the effect of birth in the United States. =" Also, by way of dictum, in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States'* the Court found that the Constitution does not authorize Congress to abridge those rights of citizenship
defined and fixed by the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.'I Id. at 453.
0 6 F.2d 670 (W.D. Wash. 1925).
1oridales v. Brownell, 217 F 2d 136 (9th Cir. 1954); Gonzales v. Landon, 215 F.2d
955 (9th Cir. 1954): Miranda v. Clark, 180 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1950).
"Fong Yue Ting v. United States. 149 U.S. 698 (1893); United States v. Peace
Information Center 97 F. Supp. 255 (D. D.C. 1951).
- 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
"3 Id. at 318.
14 99 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1951).
13Id. at 589.
16 Acheson v. Okimura, 342 U.S. 899 (1952).
17Okimura v. Acheson, 111 F. Supp. 303, (D. Hawaii 1953).
Is 121 F. Supp. 6 (D. Hawaii 1954).
9 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
20 Id.
at 703.
21 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
22 Id. at 827.
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Much stronger language was used in Kansas v. Colorado.'" There the
Court declared, in explicit repudiation of the doctrine of sovereign
powers, that it clearly appears from the Constitution that our governmerit is a government of enumerated powers."'
The irreconcilable conflict of cases in the area of expatriation had
its inception in a series of cases arising in the district court for 1awaii.'5
The existence of the troublesome constitutional question was recognized,
and that court elected to follow the cases which had rejected the doctrine
of sovereign powers. The Perez decision repudiates that view, adopts the
doctrine of sovereign powers, and expressly rejects the proposition that
the fourteenth amendment restricts the operation of the foreign relacited by the Court as authority on this
tions power. Perkins v. Elg,
point, reaches the conclusion that citizenship is deemed to continue
unless specifically revoked by terms of treaty or Congressional enactinent. 7
In view of the conclusions reached in Trop v. Dulles," however,
Perez is inconclusive authority for the proposition that deprivation of citizenship is within the scope of Congressional authority. The Trop case,
decided in the same term but subsequent to Perez, arose under § 401 (g)
of the 1940 Nationality Act. This provision provided for loss of citizenship for desertion from the armed forces during war. Trop was convicted by court martial for desertion during war. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, speaking for the Court in a five to four decision, reiterated
the position taken by the minority in the Perez decision, to the effect
that Congress was without power to enact statutory provisions for expatriation. An alternative ground, however, was stated in.deference to
the Perez decision. The Court declared that § 401 (g) was not within
the War Power of Congress, and that the effect of the section was to impose cruel and unusual punishment within the Constitutional prohibition.
The crucial question of the scope of Constitutional limitations on
the foreign relations power was decided by the Perez case. The Court
was bold indeed in declaring that this power is not limited by the fourteenth amendment, for Perez viewed with MacKenzie indicates that
there is no distinction between acts performed in the United States and
acts performed abroad. It follows logically that any act that Congress
may wish to specify which might tend to embarrass us in our relations
with other nations or interfere with the effective conduct of foreign
affairs may be deemed an expatriating act, even though the act be performed lawfully and in the exercise of rights protected by the Constitution. The application of the doctrine of sovereign powers to nationalization cases is a dangerous precedent. The alleged necessity of preventing embarrassment in the conduct of foreign affairs could well become the expedient of tyrants.
"3,206 U.S. 46 (1907).
"I Id. at 89.
2 Sakarnoto v. Dutles, 111 F. Supp. 308 (D. Hawaii 1953); Murata v. Acheson, 111
F. Supp. 306. (D Hawaii 1953) Okimura v. Acheson, 99 F. Supp. 5S7 (D. Hawaii 1951);
Ouye v. Acheson, 91 F. Supp. 129 (D. Hawaii 1950).
26 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
"7 Id. at 329.
26 78 Sup. Ct. 590 (1958).
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fncome Taxation-Funded Corporate Buy-Sell AgreementsCorporation's Paynen t of Premium for Life Insurance
On Stockholder (is I)ividenid
ROBETW L. FRYE

Robert L. Frye received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology from
Princeton University, and is currently a student at the University of Denver
College of Law.
The four stockholders of a corporation entered into a stock redemption agreement, under the terms of which the corporation bought insurance on their individual lives to fund the agreement. The corporation
paid the premiums and owned all rights in the policies, except that each
stockholder was allowed to designate the beneficiary of the policies
carried on his life. At the death of a stockholder, the corporation was
to transfer the decedent's insurance to the named beneficiary for collection, and transfer to itself as Much of the stock as could be purchased by
the proceeds at a predetermined price. The beneficiary was to get either
the value of the decedent's stock or the insurance on the decedent's life,
whichever was greater. Stock value was set by vote of the shareholders
periodically, or by arbitration if necessary. Any funds for the agreement
were to come Out of1 surplus, and if the corporation were unable to pay
the premiums out of surll us at any timc, the agreement would end, the
corporation would be named as beneficiary of the policies, and would
hold them as ordinary corporate assets. The corporation did not claim
the premiums as a deduction on its income tax, but accounted for them as
an asset on its balance sheet. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the premiums were not constructive dividends to the individual
stockholders. Sanders v. Fox, 2531 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958).
Similarly, in another recent case, PruMnier v. Commissioner,' insurance was usedl to Ifundt a buy-out agreement between two brothers, the
officers and 97o( stockholders of the corporation. Although the inisurance policies were all applied for by the brothers as individuals, and the
corporation was not named as beneficiary until some time after the Conmissioner had questioned the corporate ownership, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals found that under controlling state law the corporation
was the beneficial owner, and could have obtained the proceeds if the
iIsutrance had matured during the tax year in question. On this ground,
the court held that the premiums paid were not taxable as income to the
stockholders.
On the other hand, in Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Cornmissioner," there was an agreement between stockholders providing that
one stockholder would buy the stock of the other at the latter's decease.
This purchase was to be funded in part by insurance on the life of the
248 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 28 T.C. No. 4 (1957).
- 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946).
I
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stockholder, paid for by the corporation, but owned by the insured.
The court in this case found that both stockholders stood to benefit
equally from the payment of premiums by the corporation, but that the
corporation itself stood to gain nothing, and held that the premium
payments in question constituted dividend income to the insured stockholder, and were taxable to him.:
The Commerce Clearing House tax reporter,' in an editorial comment on the Internal Revenue Service Tax Guide for Small Business,
says that the IRS position on life insurance premiums paid by a corporation when both corporation and stockholders benefit from the payment
is that the amount of premiums may be regarded as constructive dividends, especially when a closely held corporation is involved. But the
Tenth Circuit, in passing on the Sanders case, specifically rejected the
test of "weighing the ultimate purposes to be served and the potential
benefits" ' which might accrue to either the corporation or the individual
stockholders-on the ground that such a test was "impractical." They
held that "the correct rule must limit the analysis to those benefits 'presently realized' . . . . (by the stockholder) ."'
The court in Sanders has unquestionably accepted buy-sell agr-eements as being of benefit to the corporation. In Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner,' an action brought under the Excess Profits Tax Act, the corporation had bought single-premium life insurance on its two principal
stockholder-officers, as key-man insurance, with the corporation named
as beneficiary. When a subsequent trust agreement established a buy-sell
agreement funded by this insurance, the Commissioner sought to tax the
corporation on the premiums paid for the insurance. The court held
that the premiums represented "borrowed invested capital" within the
meaning of the act, and not dividends; and they announced for the first
time that "continuity" and "harmony" of management are legitimate
3 Accord, Yuengling v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1934); Earl Dl. Jameson,
P-H 1942 B.T.A. Mem. Dec. § 42,042; cf. Casper Ranger Construction Co., I B.T.A.
942 (1925).
4 6 CCH 1958 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. § 8770.
5 253 F.2d at 860.
6 Id. at 858-59.
7 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951).
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objectives of a corporation in disbursing its funds'

-a

view expressly

applied in the Sanders and Prun ier cases.
A recent case pointing up "corporate benefit" is Casale v. Commissioner." The taxpayer was the 980 stockholder of a corporation, and its
president. He entered into a deferred compensation agreement with the
corporation, contingent on his not leaving the corporation or competing
with it "against its wishes." The corporation was authorized at the same
time, but in a separate corporate transaction, to purchase and pay
premiums on an annuity policy. The corporation was the declared
owner of the policy, and the beneficiary, but Casale had the right to
change the beneficiary under the terms of the agreement. Tile policy
was carried as an asset on the corporate bcoks, and the corporation could
assign the policy or borrow against its loan value. The Tax Court found
that the taxpayer had not dealt "at arm's length" with his corporation.
They held, in effect, that the transaction was a "sham." It was stated
t'hat Casale "was the corporation, ....
and that the corporation was merely
a "Conluit'. for passing the benefits to him.
The Second Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court, noted that the corporation was not a "sham," but a legitimate business enterprise. They
held that Casale did not realize any benefit from the policy, fcr various
reasons. The primary reason seemed to be that there was no guarantee
that the funds from the policy would be available to pay the agreed compensation, since the policy was a corporate asset and thus subject to the
fortunes of the business. It could be reached by creditors as could any
other corporate asset. The opinion stressed the point that the corporation might benefit by having the proceeds to discharge the corporate
c.bligation incurred under the deferred ccmpensation agreement, but
that it might also benefit by having the policy available to creditors in
case of corporate insolvency.
This reasoning would also seem appropriate to the buy-out agreenent cases: \,Vhether or not the corporation uses the funds to carry out
the agreements, it will get a corporate benefit from their use, possibly as
collateral for needed Icans, or in case of corporate insolvency, to pay
creditors. Further, this argument underlines the fact that the individual
stockholders may never receive any benefit from tie policies.
The Casale case seems to roughly equate "corporate benefit" with
corporate ownership of the policies, an idea which seems to be implicitly
accepted in both the Sandeis and Priinie decisions. This idea would appear to be justifiable in most cases: If the corporation owns the policies,
they are still subject to the hazards of the business, as was pointed out
above, but if the taxpayer owns them, it would appear that for all practical purposes he has received an economic benefit "unqualifiedly subject to his demand.""' This idea, furthermore, would explain the court's
holding in the Sanders case that the stockholder had received no "benefits 'presently realized'... . ..
Accord,
, 247 F.2d
10 26 T.C.
11 Ibid.
12 Hadley
s

Fred F. Fischer, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 520 (1947).
440 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 26 T.C. 1020 (1956).
at 1025.
v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 543, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
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Several cases have been decided on the question of whether premiums
paid by a corporation may be construed as income to an emlployee. It is
clear that a premium payment which is essentially in the nature of compensation is taxable. The courts have found in any one of several ways
that a premium payment was intended as compensation: if the payment
is charged to expense on the corporate books," ' or if no reservation is
made to the corporation as to ownership of the policy or power to clesignate beneficiaries,' or even where the corporation has the power to
designate the beneficiaries but it has been exercised in favor of the employee's family or estate,' such payment has been held to be colnpensation, and taxable to the individual.
The analogy between these cases and the prol)lem presented in tile
principal case was recognized by the Tenth Circuit when they said,
"These cases demonstrate the alternative rules that if' the corporation
pays preliums on a policy on the life of an employee or stockholder as
its own investment no tax consequences to the insured arise, but ifit
pays the premiums on the policy owned by the insured and of which he
designates the beneficiary the amount paid ill prenliums constitutes taxable income to him.""
Only one case has been found where it was held that the taxpayer
had not received income when le owned the policies completely. In
Lewis v. O'Malley," the president and sole stockholder of the corporation
applied for and was issued two single-premium insurance policies oil his
life, which were paid for by the corporation. He was the true owner,
could and did designate the beneficiary (his estate, his family, and a
charitable religious institution were designated at various times) , and
no reservation of an interest in the policies was made to the corporation
in any form. The Commissioner charged Lewis with having received a
dividend in the amount of the premiullls paid hy the corporation. Tile
Eighth Circuit found in favor of the taxpayer. The court found that the
policies were always treated as a corporate asset. They were carried on
the books as such, loans were made directly to the corporation Oil the
policies, and the policies were eventually surrendered and their surrenlder
value returned to the corporation. But in spite of this decision, it would
seem that unless the stockholders can clearly show that the policies are
in fact corporate assets, they run the risk of being taxed on the premiums
if they own the policies as individuals. One may wonder how tile Lewis
case might have been decided if at the time of decision tile policies were
still in force, anti owned by the taxpayer.
So
ficiaries
buy-sell
holder,

although the stockholders may be allowed to designate
and the life insurance may be made an integral part
agreement without tax consequences to the individual
the safest approach in funding such agreements with life

beneof the
stockiIsur-

1. Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 302 U.S. 694 (1937);
Canaday v. Guitteau, 86 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1936). For a similar holding as to annuities,
see United States v. Dreseher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950): Renton K. Brodie, I T.C.
275 (1942); cf. Card v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 19.54).
14 Commissioner v. Bonwit, su)ra note 13: Canaday v. Guitteau, supra note 13.
15 N. Loring Danforth, 18 B.T.A. 1221 (1930).
16253 F.2d at 859-60.
17 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
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ance would be to make the corporation clearly the owner of the policies,
and make the policies a corporate asset, not reserved to any particular
use. Further, it should be borne in mind that the Commissioner has not,
at this time, acquiesced in these decisions.
The court, in passing on the principal case, remarked that different
problems will arise at the dleath or withdrawal of one of the stockholders.
At that time the question o1 constructive dividends may again be raised.
But if, as seems likely, the decisions in Sanders v. Fox and Prunier v.
Commissioner are followed, premiums pai(d by a corporation on policies
owned by the corporation will not be taxable to the stockholder at the
time of their payment.

M,;[,,u ni.i S;&Igta
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Income Taxation - Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses Fines for Operating Overloaded Trucks Not Deductible

By

PHILIP C. PRESTON

Philip C. Preston received his B.S. in Business Administration in 1949 and
his Master's degree in Business Administration in 1957, both from the University of Denver. He is a Certified Public Accountant and is presently a
freshman in the University of Denver College of Law.

Plaintiff, a trucking company, deducted under § 23 (a) (1) (A) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 fines paid for inadvertent violations
of state statutes prescribing maximum truck axle weight limits.' These
violations usually resulted from shifting of loads during transit or from
reliance on the weight stated in bills of lading inaccurately compiled in
small communities having no weighing facilities. The federal court
denied the deduction, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fines were not
"ordinary and necessary business expenses" since the violations could
have been avoided. Since the state statutes did not make a distinction
between innocent and willful violators, allowance of the deduction for
inadvertent violations would have severely and directly frustrated state
policy. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 511
(1958).
A companion case, decided the same day, concerned another trucking company which attempted to deduct, as ordinary and necessary business expenses, fines paid by the firm and its drivers for violations of
state maximum weight laws. Pennsylvania state weight laws made it impossible for truckers to comply and still operate profitably.' In order to
continue in business, this particular trucker (like many others) had to
overload and run the risk of being fined for violating the law. The
company paid numerous fines and deducted them as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The Commissioner denied the deduction, the
Tax Court upheld his ruling, and the Third Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there
was no merit to petitioner's argument that the fines imposed were not
penalties at all, but merely a revenue toll. The State assessed these fines
as a penal measure, and their allowance as a deduction would frustrate
a sharply defined state policy. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
78 Sup. Ct. 507 (1958).
The argument of the petitioner in the Tank Truck Rentals case
(contending that the fines assessed were actually revenue tolls) is par"See. 23. Deductions from gross income.
"In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
"(a) Expenses.
"(1) Trade or business expenses.
"(A) In general. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ...
."Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 23 (a) (1) (A), as amended, 56 Stat. 819 [now, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)].
2 The law was later changed, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 75, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1957).
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allel to the reasoning of the Internal Revenue Service itself when it
issued a special ruling in September of 1942 that such fines were deductible.' That ruling remained in effect until it was rescinded by a
new ruling of the Commissioner issued November 30, 1950.' Since that
time, the Commissioner and the courts have generally held that these
penalties are punishments inflicted by the state on those who commit
acts violating fixed public policy, and that to permit a violator to gain
a tax advantage through deducting the amount of the penalty as a
business expense and thus mitigate the degree of punishment, would
frustrate the purpose and effectiveness of that public policy.' The application of the public policy standard has been tempered in cases involving innocent violation of statutes where the statute itself makes a
definite distinction between innocent and willful violations.'
The concept that the deductibility of business expenses is subject
to an overriding limitation of so-called u)Llblic policy was also recently
considered by the Supreme Court in the Sullivan case with regard to
rent and wages paid by bookies. 7 A bookmaker hired employees to help
in his gambling operations and rented premises in which he carried on
his bookmaking. The taxpayers, whose activities were alleged to be illegal tinder Illinois law,' sought to deduct these as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. The Supreme Court held both items to be deductible
business expenses which should not be disallowed on the basis of pLl)lic
policy. The Court first pointed out that the Treasury Department itself
recognizes gambling as a business. For example, the regulations make
the federal excise tax on wages a deductible item. They then point out
that the ordinary and necessary expenses of a business, like rent and
wages, should be deductible, otherwise the income tax would be levied
on gross rather than net income.
The question presents itself: why, then, when violation of a statute
has traditionally been a major ground for testing conflict with public
policy," was not the violation of the statute in the Sullivan case determinative, as it was in both the Hoover Motor Express and Tank Truck
Rentals cases? The crux of the court's reasoning in these two apparently
conflicting decisions seems to be the illegality of the act creating the
expense (violation o1 trucking statutes) as contrasted to expenses ordinarily legal (payment of rent) incurred in connection with an illegal
activity. Congress has consistently rejected provisions which would deny
deductions for illegal activities. The object of the Revenue Act of 1913,
the language of which in regard to this section has been carried forward,
was not "to reform men's characters.'"' In 1951, Senator Kefauver sought
unsuccessfully to amend § 162 by prohibiting deductions "for any ex3 Commissioner
letter issued on September 10, 1942, published in P-H 1950 Fed.
Tax Service § 76.321.
I.T. 4042. 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 112.
Commissioner V. Longhorn Portland Cement Co.. 148 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945).
6 Commissioner v. Pacific Ml:lls, 207 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1953); National Brass Works
v. Comm ssioner, 182 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1950): J. Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175
F.2d 7t1 (2d Cir. 1949).
Commissioner v. N. Sullivan. 78 Sup. Ct. 512 (1958).
8 I1. Rev. Stat.. 1945, C 38. § 336.
SU.S. Treas. Reg. 118. § 39.23(a)-I (1953); Rev. Rul. 54-219, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 51.
106 Corbin, Coitracts §§ 1373-74 (1150).
1150 Cong. Rec. 3850 (1913).
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pense paid or incurred in or as a result of illegal wagering."'- Prior to
the recodification of the Code in 1954, the American Law Institute
unsuccessfully recommended that Congress change the statute to disallow deductibility of illegal expenses."'
The public policy concept has been extended to illegitimate expenses of an illegitimate business,' but the most recent Tax Court decision allowed a deduction for expenses which appear to be of an illegitimate nature (costs of printing lottery tickets) pointing to the Sullivan
case as authority."
As the Court pointed out in the Sullivan case, deduction does not
turn on general equitable considerations but depends on legislative
grace." Although the decisions in the trucking cases may appear to be
somewhat harsh when contrasted with the Sullivan case, none of the
cases departed from the trend that the courts have taken with regard to
the two situations presented. Congress is apparently averse to utilizing
the tax code to help stamp out organized crime, so the courts have shied
away from use of the public policy concept in this area. Since the sometimes necessary violations of legitimate businesses have not been subject
to such "legislative grace," the Commissioner and the courts have made
full use of the concept in cases involving these violations.
97 Cong. Rec. 12230-31, 12244 (1951).
a A.L.I. Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X 165 (i) (1) (Feb. 1954 Draft).
"Comeaux v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949).
15 L. Cohen, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 284 (April 8, 1958).
6 Deputy v.
Du Pont, 308 U.S. 4S8 (1940).
12
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